

S E C R E T

DDI- 01377/84 25X1

29 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Executive Director  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: John L. Helgerson  
Director of African and Latin American Analysis

SUBJECT: State of Play in Southern Africa

1. Action: None. For your background use only.
2. Background: As background for your meeting tomorrow with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chet Crocker, I thought you might find it useful to know how we in ALA view recent developments in southern Africa. I have also suggested some questions that you might wish to raise with Crocker during our meeting.

South Africa-Angola-Namibia-UNITA

The US-South African-Angolan meeting in Zambia on 16 February ended in an agreement for a South African departure from southern Angola, which is to be monitored by a joint military commission of Angolans and South Africans. The USG has set up a liaison office in Namibia which will serve as a go-between. The commission met for the first time last Saturday at Cuvelai (a town over 100 miles north of the Namibian border) and the meeting apparently went well. They will set up three 100-man units from each side, plus vehicles and helicopters, and patrolling is to begin on 1 March. Pretoria said it would withdraw completely within 30 days; Luanda agreed that it was responsible for controlling SWAPO activity.

This disengagement agreement represents a considerable achievement for the USG, for which Crocker should be congratulated. The disengagement itself is very fragile, however, and several factors could derail progress toward broader issues:

- Although SWAPO has said that it will honor the disengagement in southern Angola, it insists it will continue to fight inside Namibia. Sam Nujoma is quite concerned that the Angolans will sell him out and he may be trying to act as a

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

25X1

C-301

spoiler. Pretoria says it has an intercepted message proving that SWAPO sent a 150-man force south into Namibia after the disengagement. This is probably true, although Pretoria's claim that SWAPO is sending an additional 800 guerrillas into Namibia is probably false. However, terrorist incidents in Namibia increased during February.

-- We think Jonas Savimbi is nervous about being sold out, despite assurances to the contrary, and his agreement not to disrupt the disengagement looks vague to us. UNITA has been coming on strong since the disengagement was agreed to. UNITA is engaged in a major battle in eastern Angola and seized a diamond mine last week in northcentral Angola. UNITA also said last Friday that since it is not participating in peace negotiations it is intensifying the civil war, which it said must be settled before Cubans can be withdrawn.

-- Luanda, for its part, insists publicly  that after Pretoria removes all its troops from Angolan territory, ends aid to UNITA and begins implementing the UN plan for Namibian independence, it will address the Cuban issue and talk to UNITA. We believe that the Angolans actually will negotiate with the USG about Cubans, but probably will be unable to act decisively because of the UNITA threat and the Soviets.

25X1

--

25X1

Defusing the military conflict does buy time for more negotiations, but a disengagement on the Namibian-Angolan border could become a sanctioned demilitarized zone behind which South Africa continues to maintain control of Namibia.

#### South Africa-Mozambique

We think that long-term prospects for US-brokered negotiations in this arena are brighter. Pretoria and Maputo announced on 20 February

agreement in principle on a mutual security pact, although several sticky details remain to be settled.

25X1

Both Pretoria and Maputo seem determined at the political level to abandon their respective insurgencies as part of a broad accord on security and economic issues. However, a bloody ANC attack could torpedo negotiations by strengthening hardliners in Pretoria who fundamentally mistrust the Marxist regime in Mozambique. Similarly, a strong insurgent campaign by RENAMO--to whom the South Africans reportedly will provide enough supplies to continue its current level of military activity until late 1984--could increase resistance in Maputo to Machel's overtures to Pretoria. But the momentum in the Mozambican arena seems stronger than in the more complicated nexus of Angolan-Nambian-Cuban issues, and we believe there is a significant chance--perhaps one in three--that the rapprochement will come off. Crocker--and his Deputy Frank Wisner--deserve high marks for their efforts here.

#### Waiting for the Soviet Shoe to Drop

The Soviet reaction to recent developments has been strangely muted.

25X1

We have no evidence of direct Soviet intervention in either Luanda or Maputo, a somewhat surprising reaction in view of the Soviet shipment in 1983 of about \$260 million worth of military equipment to Mozambique, and between two to three times that amount to Angola. Although Moscow may see some utility to a diminution of the security threat to Luanda and Maputo we believe that a successful outcome to these US-brokered negotiations between South Africa and its neighbors would certainly represent a significant setback to Soviet policy in southern Africa. Since we also believe that the Soviets share that view, we are waiting for some more definitive actions from Moscow.

#### Implications

While these recent developments represent significant diplomatic achievements for the US--and potentially sharp reversals for the Soviets and Cubans--we believe they represent even more singular achievements for

the South Africans. Even though they continue to hold on to Namibia, they have forced their radical, Soviet-backed neighbors to negotiate openly with them, an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of white minority rule in Pretoria. Moreover, this has been accomplished with the visible presence of the USG, reinforcing the belief of many black Africans that the US and South Africa are tacit allies. If these fragile arrangements should break down and the cycle of violence in southern Africa starts up again, the lasting impression for many in the region may be that of US-South African cooperation.

3. Recommendations: Questions for Crocker.

- What do you think Savimbi is up to? Will he observe the disengagement in southern Angola?
- How are the Soviets going to react? Don't you find it surprising that we have not heard much from them?
- Why do you think the pro-Soviet, mulatto-led hardliners in the MPLA are going along? What are the chances the MPLA will agree to a Cuban withdrawal?
- What do you think the South Africans want from these negotiations? How significant are the divisions in Pretoria on these issues?

25X1

// John L. Helgeson

25X1

S E C R E T

25X1

SUBJECT: State of Play in Southern Africa

## Distribution:

Original -- DCI  
1 -- DDCI  
1 -- Executive Director  
1 -- Executive Registry  
1 -- DDI  
1 -- ADDI  
2 -- D/ALA  
1 -- C/DDO/AF  
1 -- NIO/AF  
1 -- Chief, ALA/AF  
2 -- Deputy Chiefs, ALA/AF  
2 -- ALA/AF (Chrono)  
1 -- ALA/AF (Production File)  
2 -- ALA/AF/S  
4 -- ALA/AF/C

ALA/AF/C: [ ] (29 February 1984)

25X1